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How Social Media Companies Could Be Complicit in
Incitement to Genocide
Neema Hakim

Abstract
This Comment examines whether social media companies risk international criminal
liability when they provide a platform for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. To
answer this question, this Comment makes three findings of law. First, pursuant to the Rome
Statute, the Genocide Convention, and caselaw from the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, incitement to genocide is a
crime, not a mode of liability. Second, the mens rea for complicity, according to the Rome Statute,
is knowledge, if the crime in question is coordinated by a group (for example, a social media
campaign to incite genocide). Third, while corporations generally cannot be subjected to
international criminal liability as distinct entities, individuals conducting business on behalf of a
corporation are susceptible to liability. This Comment applies the foregoing legal principles to
employees at social media companies at various levels of the corporate hierarchy, at times through
the example of Facebook in Myanmar. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that individual
employees at social media companies may be complicit in incitement to genocide where certain legal
requirements are satisfied. This conclusion compels a broader discussion about reforming
international criminal law to stem the global propagation of disinformation, where such
propagation constitutes incitement to genocide.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
On August 25, 2017, in the western region of Myanmar known as Rakhine
State, a conflict of untold horror—long in the making—spiraled out of control.1
In the day’s first hours, a band of Rohingya Islamist insurgents, armed with sticks,
knives, and makeshift bombs attacked a series of government outposts.2 The
attacks left seventy-one dead, among them fifty-nine Rohingya militants and
twelve government officials.3 In response, the Myanmar military, known as the
Tatmadaw, announced the launch of “clearance operations,” an all-out assault on
thousands of Rohingya civilians.4 The Tatmadaw razed whole villages, killing
thousands of people.5 Women and girls were subjected to brutal gang rapes.6
Homes were reduced to ash.7 Altogether, the operations forced more than 745,000
Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.8 According to the U.N., over 600,000 Rohingya
remain at “serious risk of genocide” in Myanmar.9
The sheer scale of violence led journalists, human rights organizations, and
the U.N. to investigate the Tatmadaw’s response to the August 25 incident,
including how an entire nation remained passive as thousands of Rohingya
civilians were killed, raped, and displaced from their homes.10 These investigations
revealed an elaborate disinformation campaign, spanning years, whereby senior
Tatmadaw officials used Facebook, the “main mode of communication among

1
2

3

4

5

6

7
8

9

10

Who Are the Rohingya?, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 18, 2018), http://perma.cc/7XZG-MYBP.
Wa Lone & Antoni Slodkowski, 'And Then They Exploded': How Rohingya Insurgents Built Support for
Assault, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2017), http://perma.cc/K9XS-B4GR.
Wa Lone & Shoon Naing, At Least 71 Killed in Myanmar as Rohingya Insurgents Stage Major Attack,
REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2017), http://perma.cc/E5YN-4JZS.
Stephanie Nebehay, Brutal Myanmar Army Operation Aimed at Preventing Rohingya Return: U.N,
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2017), http://perma.cc/UP8M-MS3A.
Tun Khin, It’s Been Two Years Since 730,000 Rohingya Were Forced to Flee. There’s No End in Sight to the
Crisis, TIME (Aug. 25, 2019), http://perma.cc/DWX7-779E.
Human Rights Council, Thirty-Ninth Session, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on
Myan. Established Pursuant to Resolution 34/22, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/64 (Sept. 12, 2018)
[hereinafter Report].
Id. at ¶ 37.
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Rohingya Refugee Crisis,
http://perma.cc/S4NQ-RSQM.
Richard Sargent, 600,000 Rohingya Still in Myanmar at 'Serious Risk of Genocide': UN, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), http://perma.cc/2VB8-DK7G.
See, for example, Report, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 36-38; Steve Stecklow, Why Facebook Is Losing the War on
Hate Speech in Myanmar, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2018), http://perma.cc/QVW2-UBEM.
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the public,” to fuel nationwide majoritarian hatred toward the Rohingya.11 All the
while, Facebook provided the Tatmadaw with a massive platform to propagate
dehumanizing narratives about the Rohingya.12 For example, officials used their
accounts to frame the Rohingya as illegal immigrants, terrorists, and “inherently
violent.”13 As the Tatmadaw used Facebook to disparage the minority group,
civilian users joined in the attacks online.14 Reuters uncovered more than 1,000
examples of violent Facebook posts, some dating back to 2012, which referred to
the Rohingya as “dogs,” “maggots,” and “rapists” who ought to be “fed to pigs”
and “exterminated.”15
As dehumanizing speech spread on Facebook, and the hostility toward the
Rohingya worsened, human rights activists and experts on the region reportedly
warned Facebook executives as early as 2013 that their platform facilitated and
exacerbated the ethnic tensions in Myanmar.16 Despite these warnings, Facebook
continued providing Tatmadaw officials with a platform, devoting insufficient
resources toward preventing the spread of disinformation. For example, around
2015, “there were only two people at Facebook who could speak Burmese.”17 It
was not until 2018, when U.N. investigators formally accused Tatmadaw officials
of genocide, that the company began the systematic removal of content and
accounts belonging to military leaders.18 Facebook thereafter conceded in a blog
post, “[w]e weren’t doing enough to help prevent our platform from being used
to foment division and incite offline violence.”19
The U.N. concluded, after lengthy investigation, that there was “sufficient
information to warrant the investigation and prosecution” of senior Tatmadaw
officials for genocide.20 For its part, the International Criminal Court (ICC) held
that although Myanmar is not a member of the court, the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over crimes committed against the Rohingya with a “cross-border”

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20

Human Rights Council, Thirty-Ninth Session, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Indep. Int’l
Fact-Finding Mission on Myan. Established Pursuant to Resolution 34/22, ¶ 1345, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (Sept. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Detailed Report].
See Stecklow, supra note 10.
See Detailed Report, supra note 11, at ¶ 1334.
Id. at ¶ 1312.
Stecklow, supra note 10.
Id.
Id. Burmese is the main local language in Myanmar. Id.
Antoni Slodkowski, Facebook Bans Myanmar Army Chief, Others in Unprecedented Move, REUTERS (Aug.
27, 2018), http://perma.cc/CBB8-2DNH.
Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Facebook Admits Failings Over Incitement to Violence in Myanmar, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2018), http://perma.cc/4NJY-LZQU.
See Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 87.
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nature.21 As of June 2019, the ICC prosecutor was considering the launch of a
formal investigation into the actions of Tatmadaw officials.22 But even as
international courts and organizations contemplate whether the Tatmadaw
committed genocide, there is confusion around how to address Facebook’s
involvement in the massacre. The U.N. identifies the company’s role as
“significant,” noting in a fact-finding report that the platform “has been a useful
instrument for those seeking to spread hate” and that Facebook’s response “has
been slow and ineffective.”23 Nonetheless, in the same report, investigators did
not identify Facebook as criminally responsible.24
The confusion around Facebook’s role in Myanmar raises broader questions
about whether social media companies risk international criminal liability when
their platforms are used by bad actors to incite offline violence—and more
specifically, genocide. These questions are of increasing importance, as up to
seventy governments and political parties across the globe actively use social
media to spread disinformation.25 Notwithstanding the myriad of procedural
obstacles (for example, exercising jurisdiction) that stand in the way of
prosecution, this Comment focuses on the more narrow, substantive question of
whether social media companies can be criminally complicit in direct and public
incitement to genocide.26 This Comment concludes social media companies can
be criminally complicit in incitement.
In arguing that social media companies may risk international criminal
liability where their platforms are used to incite genocide, this Comment proceeds
in four parts. Section II discusses the substantive international crimes of genocide
and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. This analysis focuses
primarily on the latter crime of incitement but nonetheless discusses genocide to
shed light on the basic principles underlying incitement. In Section III, this
Comment identifies relevant modes of liability, including aiding and abetting and
common purpose liability. These modes of liability stipulate the requirements
which, if satisfied, would attach criminal responsibility to social media officials for
the commission of a substantive offense. Section IV analyzes how contemporary

21

22

23
24
25

26

Toby Sterling, International Criminal Court Says It Has Jurisdiction over Alleged Crimes Against Rohingya,
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2018), http://perma.cc/MWV9-S6SU.
ICC Prosecutor Seeks Bangladesh and Myanmar Investigation, REUTERS (June 26, 2019),
http://perma.cc/SM3C-SHKY.
Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 74.
See id. at ¶¶ 90–94.
See Mary Hanbury, Facebook Is the Most Popular Social Network for Governments Spreading Fake News and
Propaganda, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2019), http://perma.cc/R8QY-962C.
For brevity, this Comment refers to this crime interchangeably as “direct and public incitement to
genocide,” “incitement to genocide,” or “incitement.”
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legal standards regarding corporate liability limit culpability to natural persons.
Having introduced the pertinent international criminal law (ICL), Section V
applies the law to hypothetical cases at different levels of the corporate hierarchy.

II. P ERTINENT I NTERNATIONAL C RIMES
This Comment opens with a discussion of two international crimes:
genocide and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. For the scope of
this Comment, ICL refers to the body of international law, composed largely of
treaty law and caselaw, which imposes criminal liability on individuals.27 As the
most recent and comprehensive treaty on ICL, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) necessarily anchors discussion of
ICL. Entered into force in 2002, the Rome Statute established the ICC as a
permanent international court and empowered the court to examine ICL
principles beyond the treaty’s plain terms.28 Article 21 of the Rome Statute
authorizes the ICC to apply ICL from “applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of international law.”29 Accordingly, a proper understanding of ICL today
requires reference to older treaty law as well as caselaw more generally.
This Comment ultimately focuses on direct and public incitement to commit
genocide in the context of social media. However, a brief overview of genocide
provides useful context to understanding incitement.

A. Genocide
Considered by some to be the “crime of crimes,” genocide carries unique
weight in ICL.30 Genocide was criminalized in 1951, when the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Genocide Convention) entered into
force.31 The treaty’s ratification came as the world reeled from the horrors that
World War II inflicted upon civilian populations. Mass atrocities committed

27

28

29

30

31

See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law
Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 76 (2002) (“Unlike most fields of international law, the primary
obligations imposed by international criminal law are on individuals, not on States.”).
See Alexander Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND. L. J. 1063, 1080 (2011)
(“In the first place, even the relatively detailed provisions of the Rome Statute will require judicial
construction.”).
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 21, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
See, for example, William A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of
Crimes’, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 39, 43 (2003) (referring to genocide as the “crime of crimes”).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 278 (“Came into force on 12 January 1951 . . . .”) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
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against the Jewish people at the hands of the Nazi Party shocked a universal
conscience.32
As the International Military Tribunal (IMT) sought to prosecute the Nazis
for their crimes against humanity, scholars and world leaders coalesced around a
particular theory of “genocide.” Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer and the
Genocide Convention’s primary drafter, coined the phrase genocide “combining
geno-, from the Greek word for race or tribe, with -cide, from the Latin word for
killing.”33 Matthew Lippman writes that “[a]ccording to Lemkin, genocide
involved a two phase process, the destruction of the ‘national pattern of the
oppressed group’ and the ‘imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor.’”34
Genocide was thus conceived as a system-wide offense, a sociological
restructuring whereby institutions of power, ranging from government to media,
are weaponized to will the destruction of a particular group over time and in
multiple stages.
In converting genocide from a theory to a crime, the international
community understood the magnitude of the offense. The Genocide Convention
preamble captured a universal sentiment, characterizing genocide as a crime that
“inflicted great losses on humanity” and demanding international cooperation “to
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.”35 The parties criminalized
genocide in Articles I and II of the Genocide Convention, which provide:
Article I: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which
they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.36
32

33
34
35
36

See Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years
Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415, 452 (1998) (“The drafting of the Genocide Convention
was profoundly influenced by the Holocaust and the Cold War. There was tension between the
desire to condemn the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the aspiration to craft a
convention which was sufficiently expansive to anticipate and prevent future acts of genocide.”).
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, What Is Genocide?, http://perma.cc/3E6M-SYP8.
Lippman, supra note 32, at 423.
Genocide Convention, supra note 31, at pmbl.
Id. at arts. I-II.
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As ICL developed, genocide’s status as a crime became unequivocal. In the
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—Articles 4(2) and
2(2), respectively—the international community reaffirmed genocide as a crime,
using the exact language of the Genocide Convention.37 The Rome Statute
continued this tradition in Article 6 of that instrument, further cementing global
fidelity toward genocide’s prevention.38
While treaties criminalized genocide, international courts expanded on the
crime’s elements through interpretation, as discussed by Grant Dawson and
Rachel Boynton.39 For example, international courts have interpreted “killing
members of the group” as murder, excluding non-intentional homicides.40 The
meaning of “causing serious bodily or mental harm” has been determined on a
case-by-case basis, with consideration made to the particular circumstances.41
International courts have found this crime to include torture, sexual violence and
rape, degrading treatment, threats of death, and “harm that damages health or
causes disfigurement or injury.”42 “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” has
been extended beyond mere killing or physical harm to include instances where a
protected group is subjected to the “systematic expulsion from homes.”43 The
remaining genocidal acts, including the imposition of measures intended to
prevent birth and the forcible transfer of children, have been less developed by
courts.44
In addition to the foregoing genocidal acts (actus reus), courts have held the
mens rea of genocide to be purposeful.45 Courts have also required satisfaction of
specific intent, that is, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group
(a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group).46 Where there is an absence of
37

38
39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2(2), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602 [hereinafter
ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991 art. 4(2), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 6.
See Grant Dawson & Rachel Boynton, Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide
in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 241, 244–47 (2008)
(summarizing how genocidal acts have been interpreted by ad hoc tribunals).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 245–46.
See id. at 247.
Id. at 249.
Lippman, supra note 32, at 454–55.
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direct evidence, specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances.47 A
defendant is therefore guilty of genocide if he intentionally (mens rea) commits a
genocidal act (actus reus) with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
protected group.

B. Incitement to Genocide
In addition to genocide, international law has criminalized direct and public
incitement to commit genocide. However, because the Rome Statute lists
incitement in Article 25 entitled “Individual criminal responsibility” and not in
Article 5 entitled “Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court,” doubts have been
raised as to whether incitement is a crime (a substantive offense independent from
genocide) or a mode of liability (a means by which liability for genocide attaches).48
Notwithstanding Article 25 placement, this Comment concludes that incitement
can and should be treated as a crime, not a mode of liability. History, treaty law,
and relevant precedent all point towards such a reading.

1. Treaty law: the Genocide Convention, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes,
and the Rome Statute
The criminalization of incitement to genocide reflects the longstanding view
that genocide is a multi-stage process which begins long before systemic violence
occurs. Lemkin saw this process as one moving “from stigmatisation and
dehumanisation through violence and terror and eventual annihilation.”49
Accordingly, to curb genocide as early as possible, the Genocide Convention
criminalized not only genocidal acts, which manifest in the latter stages of the
crime, but also other acts that may occur earlier.50 Those additional crimes,
stipulated in Article III, are directed towards the prevention of “stigmatisation”
and “dehumanisation.” Included among these Article III crimes is the “[d]irect
and public incitement to commit genocide.” 51
Following the Genocide Convention, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes similarly
established incitement as a crime, using the same language as Article III of the
Genocide Convention. The ICTY Statute criminalizes incitement in Article 4(3)(c)

47
48

49
50
51

Dawson & Boynton, supra note 39, at 251.
See, for example, Thomas E. Davies, Note, How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on
Incitement to Genocide, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 260 (2009).
Can the World Stop Genocide?, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2018), http://perma.cc/HD48-CV3G.
Id.
See Genocide Convention, supra note 31, at art. III.
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and the ICTR Statute does so in Article 2(3)(c).52 Complicating the picture with
respect to treaty law, however, is the Rome Statute’s treatment of incitement. 53
Unlike the Genocide Convention and the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the
Rome Statute does not adopt the exact language of the previous treaties on
incitement. Article 25 of the Rome Statute states, “In accordance with this Statute,
a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person . . . [i]n respect of the crime of
genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.”54 Article 25 is
entitled “Individual criminal responsibility” and outlines the rules around various
modes of liability. 55
Notwithstanding incitement’s placement in Article 25, the Commentary on
the Law of the International Criminal Court (CLICC) takes the position that
incitement to genocide is a crime under the Rome Statute, not a mode of liability.
CLICC editor Mark Klamberg writes;
Article 25(3)(e) of the ICC Statute criminalises direct and public incitement
of others to commit genocide. It is in substance identical to Article III(c) of
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, and the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. Genocide is the only
international crime to which public incitement has been criminalised. The
reason for this provision is to prevent the early stages of genocide even prior
to the preparation or attempt thereof.56

W.K. Timmermann concurs with this position, writing that incitement “has of
course been unequivocally recognized” as a crime.57
At least one commentator has contended that incitement’s inclusion in
Article 25 converted it from a crime to a mode of liability.58 Thomas Davies argues
the Rome Statute “makes a crucial departure from earlier instruments with respect
to genocide” and “denies incitement the status of an independent crime, and
instead presents it as a type of individual criminal responsibility for genocide.”59
As Davies notes, Article 5 is entitled “Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”
and makes no mention of incitement.60 This approach finds further support in
52
53
54
55
56

57
58
59
60

ICTR Statute, supra note 37, at art. 2(3)(c); ICTY Statute, supra note 37, at art. 4(3)(c).
See Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 25(3)(e).
Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 25(3)(e).
Id. at art. 25.
See Mark Klamberg, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 261, 271 n.272 (Mark Klamberg ed., 2017) [hereinafter
CLICC].
See W.K. Timmerman, Incitement in International Criminal Law, 88 INT’L R. RED CROSS 823, 846 (2006).
See Davies, supra note 48, at 245.
Id. at 260.
Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 5.
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Article 22(2), which provides that “[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly
construed” and that ambiguities should be “interpreted in favour of the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”61
The implications of this approach are significant. If Davies is correct, the
Rome Statute substantially reduces the scope of criminal conduct under ICL.62
For example, if direct and public incitement is a crime, it creates “various forms
of secondary liability to hold a range of individuals responsible beyond those who
directly commit the incitement.”63 Davies points to examples of who might be
prosecuted for complicity in incitement—the speechwriter who pens a genocideinciting speech or the manager of a radio station that airs inciting broadcasts.64 But
if incitement is not a crime, it cannot generate secondary liability. Those who assist
inciters would be immune from prosecution. Davies recognizes this as a
drawback. To “correct the problem,” he recommends the Rome Statute be
amended.65
While an amendment would satisfy a strict textualist approach to the Rome
Statute, the treaty as currently written can and should be interpreted as
criminalizing incitement to genocide. Article 21 entitled “Applicable law” requires
the ICC to first apply the Rome Statute, but it also forecloses disregard for broader
principles of international law.66 Specifically, upon review of the Rome Statute,
Article 21(1)(b) requires the ICC to apply, where appropriate, “applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law.”67 One such rule, already applied
by ICC judges, is the “General Rule of Interpretation” codified in Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.68 Article 31 states, “A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”69

61
62

63
64
65
66
67
68

69

Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 22(2); see also Davies, supra note 48, at 263.
If Davies’ theory is correct and incitement was made a mode of liability by the Rome Statute, social
media companies would be, in effect, immunized from criminal liability because there would be no
underlying substantive offense to which liability could attach.
Davies, supra note 48, at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 246.
See Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 21.
Id.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Caroline Davidson, How to Read International Criminal
Law: Strict Construction and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 37,
54 (2017) (“ICC judges already have invoked the principles of the Vienna Convention in
interpreting the Rome Statute, in particular the basic or ‘general rule’ of the Vienna Convention.”).
Vienna Convention, supra note 68, at art. 31.
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Article 31 further notes that a treaty’s preamble should be considered as part of
an object and purpose inquiry.70
The preamble to the Rome Statute establishes that the object and purpose
of the treaty was to ensure the “effective prosecution” of “the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole” and “to contribute to the
prevention of such crimes.”71 The States Parties reflected on the 20th century,
considering themselves “[m]indful that during this century millions of children,
women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock
the conscience of humanity.”72 As evidenced by the relevant treaty law and
caselaw, incitement to genocide—by virtue of its close nexus to genocide—has
been consistently considered among the world’s most serious crimes.73 The entire
point of making incitement itself a crime was to prevent genocide, and such
prevention is explicitly contemplated in the Rome Statute’s preamble.74 It
therefore makes little sense to halt an analysis of incitement at its location in the
Rome Statute and the text of article titles. Rather, the inclusion of incitement at
all demonstrates that the international community sought to continue its
punishment, consistent with decades of well-developed international law.75
Article 22(2)’s requirement that ambiguities be resolved in favor of the
defendant does not lead to a different result.76 Any ambiguity resulting from
incitement’s placement in Article 25 is clarified by application of the General Rule
of Interpretation, which is not only permitted but also compelled by Article 21.
Accordingly, this Comment adopts the CLICC approach to the Rome Statute—
incitement is a crime not a mode of liability.

2. Caselaw: the International Military Tribunal and the ICTR
In addition to treaty law, caselaw confirms that incitement to genocide is a
crime.77 Where treaties fail to expand on incitement’s elements, precedent
provides an indispensable tool to understand incitement doctrine. Specifically,
decisions by the IMT and the ICTR reveal that in order for the defendant to be
convicted of incitement to genocide, the following elements must be satisfied: (1)
the incitement must be intentional; (2) it must be public; (3) it must be direct; and
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id.
Rome Statute, supra note 29, at pmbl.
Id.
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See Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 22(2).
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509–18 (2008).
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(4) the inciter must have the specific intent to cause genocide.78 The seminal cases
illustrate how incitement’s criminalization serves to prevent the “stigmatisation”
and “dehumanisation” that compose the early stages of genocide.79
a) IMT Caselaw
Two IMT cases, Streicher and Fritzche, provide an early window into
incitement doctrine.80 They were decided after WWII, prior to the ratification of
the Genocide Convention. Accordingly, the prosecution did not seek convictions
for “incitement to genocide” but rather for crimes against humanity.81
Nonetheless, these cases established the foundations of incitement upon which
the ICTR later built.
In Streicher, defendant Julius Streicher was the editor of an anti-Semitic
German weekly newspaper, Der Stürmer, a publication which in 1935 had a
circulation of 600,000.82 From 1923 to 1945, he played a role in the routine
dissemination of content which encouraged violence towards the Jewish people.83
For example, in twenty-three different articles, Streicher called for their
extermination “root and branch.”84 He commonly used dehumanizing phrases
such as “germ,” “pest,” or “parasite” when referring to Jews.85 In 1940, Streicher
published a letter from one of his readers that “compared Jews with swarms of
locusts which must be exterminated completely.”86 Streicher continued publishing
propaganda even as the mass execution of Jews was ongoing.87 The IMT
concluded that “[i]n his speeches and articles, week after week, month after
month, [Streicher] infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and
incited the German people to active persecution.”88 Streicher was convicted for
crimes against humanity and subsequently put to death.89
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See Can the World Stop Genocide?, supra note 49.
United States v. Streicher, Judgment, 301 (Int’l Military Trib. Oct. 1, 1946), http://perma.cc/6JURL9TZ; United States v. Fritzsche, Judgment, 336 (Int’l Military Trib. Oct. 1, 1946),
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Benesch, supra note 77, at 509.
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In Fritzsche, the defendant Hans Fritzsche held various roles in German
media, including as a radio commentator, as the chief of the Home Press Division
(a propaganda news service), and eventually as the head of the Radio Division of
the German Propaganda Ministry.90 Fritzsche oversaw the publication of 2,300
German daily newspapers, a role which involved issuing media guidance—
developed at higher levels of the Nazi bureaucracy—highlighting themes such as
“the Jewish problem” and “the problem of living space.”91 As the leader of the
Radio Division, Fritzsche came under the supervision of Joseph Goebbels and
would relay the “news” of the day, which was often false.92 In contrast to Streicher,
the IMT did not find Fritzsche guilty of incitement, reasoning that although he
“sometimes made strong statements of a propagandistic nature in his broadcasts”
and although his speeches showed “definite anti-Semitism,” the prosecution failed
to show that his statements “were intended to incite the German people to
commit atrocities.”93 The IMT also made note of the fact that Fritzsche’s
“position and official duties were not sufficiently important . . . to infer that he
took part in originating or formulating propaganda campaigns.”94
The IMT cases demonstrate how courts reviewed not only the content of
potentially inciting statements, to determine whether they amounted to calls for
genocide, but also whether they were broadcast to substantial audiences (a
foreshadowing of the eventual “public” requirement). Perhaps the most important
contribution of these cases, however, is the special attention paid by the IMT to
whether the statements were part of a deliberate campaign, suggesting that even
where there is no explicit call for genocide, a systematic propaganda campaign
may rise to the level of incitement (a foreshadowing of the eventual “direct”
requirement). This construction of incitement is consistent with Lemkin’s theory
of genocide as an attempt to fundamentally restructure society. Such principles
informed the ICTR’s analysis and expansion of incitement doctrine.
b) ICTR Caselaw
The ICTR built on the IMT’s jurisprudence in its own series of cases.
Akayesu was the first such case.95 The defendant Jean-Paul Akayesu was the mayor
of the Rwandan town of Taba.96 He addressed a crowd of over 100 people, calling
90
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on them to “unite in order to eliminate what he termed the sole enemy: the
accomplices of the Inkotanyi.”97 Akayesu also read aloud the names of those he
purported to be accomplices.98 While the Inkotanyi was a particular militarypolitical faction of the Tutsis, the ICTR found, after hearing testimony on cultural
and linguistic context, that “Akayesu himself was fully aware . . . that his call to
fight against the accomplices of the Inkotanyi would be construed as a call to kill
the Tutsi in general.”99 Akayesu was convicted of the crime of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, which the ICTR noted to be “distinct from the
crime of genocide.”100
Importantly, in the Akayesu decision, the ICTR also elaborated the definition
of incitement:
[D]irect and public incitement must be defined for the purposes of
interpreting Article 2(3)(c), as directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit
genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public
places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for
sale or display of written material or printed matter in public places or at
public gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or
through any other means of audiovisual communication.101

The Court further held that directness must be considered “in light of its cultural
and linguistic content,” noting that an implicit statement, like the one made by
Akayesu, may be sufficient.102
While Akayesu established that the ICTR would punish incitement as a crime,
the communication in that case was less analogous to the widely circulated
publications in Streicher, where the incitements were part of a systematic campaign.
On the other hand, in Nahimana, known widely as the Media Case, the ICTR
considered the issue of national propaganda campaigns.
The Media Case involved three defendants, including Ferdinand Nahimana,
Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze—the purported “masterminds
behind a media campaign to desensitize the Hutu population and incite them to
murder the Tutsi population in Rwanda in 1994.”103 Nahimana and Barayagwiza
together founded Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and from
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Timmerman, supra note 57, at 841 (quoting Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T at ¶ 557).
Sophia Kagan, The “Media Case” Before the Rwanda Tribunal: The Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, THE
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July 1993 to July 1994 broadcast anti-Tutsi messages to nationwide audiences.104
The ICTR Trial Chamber convicted them of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, noting that “RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping
in a manner that promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi population and
called on listeners to seek out and take up arms against the enemy”105 and that
“Nahimana and Barayagwiza were, respectively, ‘number one’ and ‘number two’
in the top management of the radio.”106 Ngeze similarly managed a newsletter
called Kangura, which from 1990 to 1995 published articles that also conveyed
“hate-filled messages” about the Tutsis.107 The Trial Chamber accordingly
convicted him of incitement.108
Susan Benesch notes how the ICTR Trial Chamber’s decision failed to
specify which acts constituted “incitement to genocide.”109 Moreover, the Trial
Chamber’s decision aroused concerns that incitement had been erroneously
conflated with hate speech.110 The ICTR Appeals Chamber sought to resolve these
problems through a meticulous analysis of each RTLM broadcast and Kangura
article, ultimately concluding that the Trial Chamber had not confused hate speech
with incitement to genocide.111 Instead, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial
Chamber’s holding that an incitement need not be explicit, reasoning that cultural
context may demonstrate that an audience clearly understood the statements as
inciting genocide.112 The Appeals Chamber did, however, reverse Barayagwiza’s
incitement conviction, noting—like the IMT in Fritzsche—that he was Nahimana’s
subordinate. Nahimana and Ngeze’s convictions were affirmed.113
The foregoing IMT and ICTR cases provide rich guidance as to incitement’s
four elements, particularly the harder-to-prove elements of “direct” and “public.”
Public incitement means “that the call for criminal action is communicated to a
number of individuals in a public place or to members of the general public at
large particularly by technological means of mass communication, such as by radio
or by television.”114 Direct incitement may be either a particular statement that
104
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explicitly calls for genocide or implicit statements that, in their cultural context,
are understood as calls for genocide.115 International courts especially consider
systematic propaganda campaigns, in addition to individual statements, as
satisfying incitement; however, in analyzing campaigns they are less likely to
convict the propagandist’s deputies.

III. M ODES OF L IABILITY
In addition to the principal perpetrator of a crime, ICL allows for the
prosecution of other actors for the same crime through various modes of liability.
This Section examines two modes which may impose liability on the employees
of social media companies, aiding and abetting liability and common purpose
liability. Aiding and abetting extends criminal liability to those who assist in a
crime. Common purpose liability—a relatively new form of liability created by the
Rome Statute—functions similarly to aiding and abetting, when the crime has
been committed by a group. This Comment therefore considers both modes to
be variations of complicity. Article 25 of the Rome Statute explicates their
requirements, which control for the purpose of ICC jurisprudence. After
discussing aiding and abetting and common purpose liability, this Section
examines complicity in incitement.

A. Aiding and Abetting
Aiding and abetting liability has long been a feature of ICL.116 According to
Doug Cassel, the doctrine dates back to the 1945 Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, which imposed liability on “accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit” a crime
listed in the Charter.117 Aiding and abetting is also captured in Article 25(3)(c) of
the Rome Statute which states,
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person . . . [f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime,
aids, abets or otherwise assists in the commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission.118
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Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U.
J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 307 (2008).
Id. (quoting the U.N. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for
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Pursuant to Article 25(3)(c), aiding and abetting consists of two elements, the
actus reus and the mens rea.119
The ICC construes the actus reus of aiding and abetting to be the provision
of practical or material as well as moral or psychological assistance to the principal
perpetrator.120 However, the “precise actus reus threshold” remains an open
question.121 The tribunals may provide useful insight to this effect. They have held
that “aiding and abetting requires acts or omissions that assist, encourage or lend
moral support to crimes.”122 The tribunals have also required that the aider and
abettor’s conduct “substantially” contribute to the commission, similar to the
ICC’s notion of “material” assistance.123
The mens rea for aiding and abetting under the Rome Statute, as indicated
in Article 25(3)(c), is purpose.124 This requirement is markedly harder to prove
than the mens rea applied by ad hoc tribunals, which is knowledge.125 For example,
the ICTY Trial Chamber in Šešelj held that, as it pertains to the defendant’s
contributions, “the aider and abettor must have known that these acts had
contributed to the perpetration of the crime and been aware of the essential
elements of the crime, including the intent of the principal perpetrator, without
necessarily knowing the exact crime that was intended or committed.”126 Although
the Rome Statute’s mens rea for aiding and abetting is higher than the standard
applied by the ad hoc tribunals, common purpose liability—a Rome Statute
innovation—effectively lowers it back to knowledge for group crimes.

B. Common Purpose
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute establishes “common purpose liability,”
which this Comment considers a form of complicity. The Article stipulates:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person . . . in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
119
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Cassel, supra note 116, at 308.
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(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the
crime.127

Accordingly, common purpose liability lowers the requisite mens rea from
purpose to knowledge, while preserving the same actus reus as aiding and abetting
liability.
In addition to the mens rea of knowledge and the actus reus of material
contribution, common purpose liability introduces the element of group
criminality. The substantive offense to which liability attaches must have been
committed by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. In other words,
it must be a group crime. Because genocide and incitement to genocide are, by
their nature, almost always committed by groups—specifically, state entities or
media organizations—common purpose liability will almost always apply to these
crimes.128 Therefore, in many cases, complicity in genocide or in incitement, under
the Rome Statute, only requires that the defendant knowingly contributes to the
substantive offense.

C. Complicity in Incitement
Incitement’s status as a crime raises the question of whether it permits
secondary liability. As scholars and commentators have acknowledged, incitement
is often considered an “inchoate crime,” a punishable step toward the commission
of another substantive offense (for example, the crime of attempted murder).129
As complicity does not generally attach to inchoate crimes, some contend a person
cannot be complicit in inciting genocide.130 Indeed, the ICTR Trial Chamber
suggested as much in Akayesu, noting in a footnote:
It appears from the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention that only
complicity in the completed offence of genocide was intended for
punishment and not complicity in an attempt to commit genocide, complicity
in incitement to commit genocide nor complicity in conspiracy to commit
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Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 25(3)(d) (emphasis added).
Common purpose liability would not apply to genocide or incitement where such crimes are
committed by one person. For example, if the perpetrator, acting alone, directly and publicly incites
genocide, the prosecution would need to show that the aider and abettor purposefully contributed
to the incitement. A showing of knowledge would not warrant a complicity conviction.
See Timmerman, supra note 57, at 846 (contending that incitement is widely accepted to be an
inchoate crime).
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genocide, all of which were, in the eyes of some states, too vague to be
punishable under the Convention.131

The ICTR Appeals Chamber, however, rejected this interpretation as to
incitement, perhaps because any concerns around vagueness had been addressed
by a budding jurisprudence. The Court provided that a defendant can be complicit
in direct and public incitement to commit genocide, notwithstanding its character
as an inchoate crime.132 The Appeals Chamber’s reasoning is consistent with the
view that the effective prevention of genocide requires curbing its earliest stages.
In Nyiramasuhuko, the prosecution advanced the theory—before the ICTR
Appeals Chamber—that defendant Joseph Kanyabashi had aided and abetted
direct and public incitement to commit genocide.133 In that case, Prime Minister
Kambanda and President Sindikubwabo delivered speeches which the
prosecution argued to be incitements to genocide.134 Kanyabashi gave his own
speech, in which he supported their message and pledged to execute the directives
and instructions announced by Kambanda and Sindikubwabo.135 The ICTR
Appeals Chamber ultimately rejected the prosecution’s argument, grounding its
objection not in the impossibility of complicity in incitement but in its conclusion
that defendant’s conduct did not meet the legal requirements for complicity in
incitement.136
The ICTR Appeals Chamber noted incitement’s status as an inchoate crime,
but nonetheless proceeded with a complicity in incitement analysis. Specifically,
the Chamber held:
As an inchoate crime, direct and public incitement to commit genocide is
completed as soon as the discourse is uttered or published, even though the
effects of incitement may extend in time, and is punishable even if no act of
genocide has resulted therefrom. Accordingly, in order for Kanyabashi to be
found responsible for aiding and abetting direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, it would have to be established that he substantially
contributed to Kambanda’s and Sindikubwabo’s inciting speeches themselves
and not, as the Prosecution suggests, to the effects of their incitements by
“reiterat[ing] and reinforce[ing] their message.”137
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The Chamber went on to note that because Kanyabashi’s speech occurred after
the incitement, it could not have substantially contributed to its commission—
suggesting that if the prosecution had shown that Kanyabashi substantially
contributed to the inciting speeches, he could have been complicit in inciting
genocide.138
Nyiramasuhuko therefore clarifies that an aider and abettor can be complicit
in the direct and public incitement to commit genocide, notwithstanding
incitement’s status as an inchoate crime. The extension of complicity to incitement
is undoubtedly controversial, as it dramatically expands the scope of criminal
conduct associated with a speech act. But there are two points that ought to curb
this controversy to some extent.
First, genocide is the only substantive offense in all of ICL for which
incitement is also criminalized.139 Article 25 of the Rome Statute makes this
clear.140 While the knowing contributor to direct and public incitement to genocide
may be implicated in an international crime, the same cannot be said for he who
knowingly or purposefully contributes to the vast array of expressive conduct that
falls short of incitement to genocide (for example, incitement to non-genocidal
violence). This unique criminalization of complicity reflects the distinctive place
that genocide holds in ICL. It also provides the ICC prosecutor with a powerful
tool to punish those who knowingly contribute to inciting genocide, where the
inciters are coordinating as a group.
Second, the ICC prosecutor has constrained resources and thus selects cases
according to limiting principles, including the gravity of the crimes, the degree of
responsibility of the alleged perpetrators, and the potential charges.141
Accordingly, consistent with the degree of culpability, those complicit in
incitement may be less of a prosecutorial priority than those who incite genocide,
who may be less of a priority than those who commit genocide. This may not be
the case, however, with respect to social media companies, given their profound
influence over the dissemination of information today.142

IV. C ORPORATE C RIMINAL L IABILITY
Thus far, this Comment has discussed the most relevant international crimes
(Section II) and the modes of liability most pertinent for later analysis (Section
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See Section V.
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III). Given this Comment’s examination of whether social media companies risk
international criminal liability when they grant inciters a platform, it is imperative
to explore whether a corporation may be held responsible for international crimes
and the implications of this inquiry on criminal liability.
Although scholars continue to debate the normative question of whether
ICL should extend to corporations, ICL does not generally allow for their
prosecution as collective entities.143 The Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall
have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”144 The use of
“natural persons” was no accident. The drafters of the Rome Statute disagreed
about whether criminal liability ought to be extended to “legal persons,” knowing
it would include corporations under its jurisdiction, but ultimately decided against
this language.145
While corporations as collectives cannot be subjected to ICC prosecution,
their individual employees can, even when engaging in business activity.
According to Cassel, there is a long history of corporate executives being held
criminally responsible under ICL.146 ICL has been applied in instances where a
company’s employee committed a crime him or herself, as well as instances where
that employee aided and abetted in the commission of a crime. Wolfgang Kaleck
and Miriam Saage-Maaß endorse this view, writing that “[c]ase law shows that
individuals within a corporation . . . can be held criminally liable for the
commission” of an international crime “occurring in the process of ‘doing
business.’”147 Such precedent dates back to the Nuremberg trials, which
demonstrate that corporate executives are not immune from criminal prosecution.
For example, in the principal Nuremberg case, “German industrialist Gustav
Krupp was originally indicted along with top Nazi government, party and military
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See Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955,
955 (2008) (“Corporations are not presently subject to criminal liability under international law.”).
Some argue that ICL does currently permit corporate liability. See, for example, Caroline Kaeb, The
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leaders, and escaped prosecution only by reason of age and infirmity.”148
Prosecutors had stated that executives at German corporations were instrumental
in supporting the Nazi party.
In The Zyklon B Case, the British Military Court in Hamburg examined
whether a number of German businessmen were complicit in “the murder of
interned allied civilians by means of poison gas.”149 The men faced trial for
working at a company which supplied the Nazis with Zyklon B, a highly toxic gas
used to murder Jews in concentration camps.150 Defendants included the firm’s
owner Bruno Tesch, his “second-in-command” Karl Weinbacher, and gassing
technician Joachim Drosihn.151 In their defense, Tesch and Weinbacher relied
upon the fact that they were not present at the concentration camps.152 The
prosecution contended this was immaterial, that knowingly supplying “a
commodity to a branch of the State which was using that commodity for the mass
extermination” of civilians was illegal.153 Citing reports from the firm’s own
employees, prosecutors argued the defendants became aware that Zyklon B gas
was being used for the “extermination of human beings” and that “having
acquired this knowledge, they continued to arrange supplies of the gas” in “everincreasing quantities.”154 Tesch and Weinbacher were found guilty, while Drosihn
was acquitted.155 The Court concluded that Tesch and Weinbacher, as the
company’s top executives, materially contributed to the crime when their business
continued supplying gas to the Nazis and that they did so knowing the gas would
be used to kill human beings.156 In contrast, Drosihn, a mere technician, lacked
the authority “to influence the transfer of gas . . . or to prevent it.”157 He was
therefore acquitted.158
Beyond the Rome Statute and the relevant precedent, the potential
culpability of individuals operating through businesses traces back to earlier
treaties. The Genocide Convention unequivocally states that “private individuals”
148
149
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 101–02.
Id. at 102.
Id.

Summer 2020

105

Chicago Journal of International Law

may be punished for the commission of Article III acts, such as genocide and
direct and public incitement to commit genocide.159 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes
granted jurisdiction over “natural persons,” which necessarily include individuals
acting on behalf of businesses.160
Thus, this Comment proceeds having established that individuals acting on
behalf of corporations are fully capable of committing international crimes. As
demonstrated by The Zyklon B Case, such individuals may also be complicit in the
commission of a substantive offense.

V. H OW S OCIAL M EDIA C OMPANIES C OULD B E C OMPLICIT IN
I NCITEMENT TO G ENOCIDE
Thus far, this Comment has concluded the following: (1) the direct and
public incitement to commit genocide is a crime; (2) an actor may be complicit in
the direct and public incitement to commit genocide via aiding and abetting
liability or, as is more likely, common purpose liability; and (3) while international
criminal liability cannot extend to a corporation, liability can reach individuals
working on behalf of that corporation. Applying these principles, this Section
examines whether social media companies put their employees at risk of
international criminal liability when they provide inciters with a platform.
Specifically, this Comment illustrates—through the example of Facebook in
Myanmar—how complicity would apply to individuals at three levels of the
corporate hierarchy: the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the manager, and the
content moderator.161
By applying the theory of complicity in incitement to the foregoing cases,
this Section highlights the sweeping ramifications of this novel theory, as well as
its limitations. Such results ought to provoke broader discussion about whether
the ICC should more seriously consider the prosecution of social media executives
and how social media companies can reduce their employees’ exposure to criminal
liability.
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A. Inciting Genocide on Social Media
As a threshold matter, a social media company’s employee cannot be
complicit in directly and publicly inciting genocide unless the incitement has been
committed on social media. Four elements must be satisfied in order for someone
to be guilty of incitement: (1) the incitement must be intentional (mens rea); 2) it
must be public; (3) it must be direct; and (4) the defendant must have the specific
intent to cause genocide.
The question of whether an incitement is intentional—distinct from the
question of specific intent—turns on whether the statement itself is intentional.
Accordingly, in the context of social media, an incitement will almost always be
intentional, given that one rarely posts online accidentally.
Whether an incitement is public or direct is a more difficult inquiry. But
because social media is, by its nature, a “technological means of mass
communication,” proving incitement as public is less of an obstacle.162 In this way,
incitements on social media are no different from Streicher’s weekly newspaper
or Nahimana’s radio broadcast.163 They all involve the widespread dissemination
of information to external audiences and are therefore all public. There are some
notable distinctions, however, between social media and these other mediums, at
least with respect to certain applications of social media. For example, using social
media for private messaging would probably not be public. Moreover, if a social
media user has tailored his or her privacy settings such that the incitement is
viewable only among a small number of individuals, the post may not satisfy the
public requirement.164 But generally speaking, the use of social media to post
incitements for others to view will likely be public. With respect to Myanmar, a
2018 report by the U.N. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar (IIFFMM) revealed that Tatmadaw officials routinely used social media
to disseminate information about the Rohingya to nationwide audiences.165 Any
incitement was therefore public, more similar to a newspaper or a radio broadcast
than private correspondence among a small number of individuals.
The next question is whether the incitement is direct. As stipulated in Section
II.B., while a vague suggestion is not direct, an incitement need not be an explicit
162
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See CLICC, supra note 56, at 271 n.272 (noting that an incitement is public where a “technological
means of mass communication” is deployed).
See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 486 (Dec. 3, 2003),
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call for genocide.166 Where the incitement is not explicit, the court reviews cultural
context to determine whether the audience clearly understood the statement as a
call for genocide.167 To that effect, a systematic propaganda campaign to
dehumanize a protected group may constitute direct incitement.168 Statements
which in isolation fall short of incitement may, in the aggregate, satisfy the direct
requirement. This approach is consistent with a multi-staged conception of
genocide, which begins with the systematic dehumanization of a protected group.
It recognizes that a campaign of implicit statements may more effectively incite
genocide than one explicit call. The courts in Streicher and in the Media Case
understood as much, emphasizing the systematic nature of the incitements in
those cases.
Social media plainly allows for the possibility of direct incitements. Like print
newspapers and radio broadcasts, social media provides inciters with a platform
to disseminate their messages. Social media may actually enhance the inciter’s
capacity to dehumanize a protected group. Unlike conventional media, it deploys
algorithms with a tendency to amplify content tailored to individual
predispositions, whatever they may be.169 Such algorithms may contribute to the
exacerbation of existing social tensions within a nation.170 In extreme cases, this
could result in the dehumanization of a protected group and therefore help set the
social conditions necessary for genocide.171 But even if a court ignored the role of
algorithms, social media’s capacity to circulate incitements is sufficiently
analogous to the conventional media used in Streicher and the Media Case to
facilitate direct incitement, through either the explicit call for genocide or the
implicit but systematic campaign to dehumanize a protected group.172
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In Myanmar, the IIFFMM found that Tatmadaw officials used Facebook to
execute a systematic campaign to dehumanize the Rohingya.173 Officials actively
promoted the narrative that the Rohingya did not exist in Myanmar. For example,
on September 1, 2017, one senior official stated “so we openly declare that
‘absolutely, our country has no Rohingya race.’”174 Moreover, officials reinforced
the “narrative of the whole Rohingya population being ‘terrorists’ and inherently
violent.”175 The IIFFMM also found that “[m]ost of the Myanmar authorities’
posts and communications [ ] directly [fed] the narratives of illegal immigration
and Islamic threat.”176 Even if these statements only implicitly dehumanized the
Rohingya, the IIFFMM produced evidence that the audience potentially
understood the posts as calls for genocide, citing user comments on Tatmadaw
posts.177 While further analysis is required to discern whether the Tatmadaw’s
campaign constituted direct incitement, an implicit but systematic effort to
dehumanize the Rohingya may be sufficient under Streicher and the Media Case,
where similar tactics resulted in direct incitement. 178
Finally, a prosecutor must show the alleged inciter had the specific intent to
cause genocide. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances.179 Where a
genocide actually occurs, this inquiry may be straightforward, as the genocide itself
provides strong evidence of specific intent.180 Nonetheless, the content of the post
or the systematic nature of the incitements may also suggest specific intent.
International courts are reluctant to find specific intent where the individual
merely passed along content developed by another, as evidenced by the acquittals
in Fritzsche and the Media Case.181 Accordingly, individuals on social media who
merely promote or share inciting content spontaneously, and not as part of some
organized campaign, are unlikely to have the specific intent necessary for an
incitement conviction. Applying these principles to Myanmar, it may be difficult
to show that citizens who shared Tatmadaw Facebook posts, even where the post
dehumanized the Rohingya, committed incitement. But if the ICC concludes that
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Tatmadaw officials committed genocide, the specific intent argument might be
strengthened.

B. Complicity in Inciting Genocide on Social Media
Once direct and public incitement to commit genocide is established, the
potential complicity of others becomes an open question, and incitements on
social media may implicate employees at the company providing the platform. As
discussed in Section III, there are two main tracks for complicity under the Rome
Statute: (1) aiding and abetting liability; and (2) common purpose liability.182
Because the requisite mens rea for common purpose liability is knowledge, while
the mens rea for aiding and abetting is purpose, a prosecutor is more likely to
obtain a conviction where the incitement is perpetrated by a “group of persons
acting with a common purpose.”183 Therefore, an employee faces a greater risk of
complicity in an incitement campaign—which requires coordination among
multiple actors—than an isolated call for genocide.184 This Section’s analysis is
therefore limited to complicity in campaigns, for which the mens rea is knowledge.
Accordingly, a social media employee who knowingly assists a campaign to incite
genocide is complicit in that crime.185 As evidenced by The Zyklon B Case,
complicity also varies depending on where an individual is positioned in the
corporate hierarchy.186 Accordingly, this Comment examines the risk of complicity
through three examples: the CEO, the manager, and the content moderator.

1. The CEO
This Comment first analyzes the CEO. It is presumed the CEO has the
foremost control over the social media company, setting the overall direction for
the enterprise and making fundamental business decisions. While the CEO’s
awareness of business activity is likely broader than his or her subordinates with
respect to scope, he or she is less likely to know the day-to-day details of the
company.
First, a prosecutor must show that the social media CEO assisted the
incitement. According to the ICC, assistance may be practical or material, as well
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as moral or psychological.187 Since this case involves the assistance of business
executives, The Zyklon B Case serves as instructive precedent. The social media
CEO is most analogous to Bruno Tesch, the owner of the firm in that case.188
There, the Court held that Tesch assisted the Nazis, reasoning that his company
provided the Nazis with material means (toxic gas) for the crime’s commission
(killing via gas chambers). Similarly, the CEO of a social media company satisfies
the actus reus of complicity if he or she provides a platform, the material means,
to individuals executing a systematic propaganda campaign which amounts to
incitement, the crime. The extent to which the CEO is involved likely bears on
the materiality of the contribution. For example, one could imagine a scenario
where a CEO delegates authority to expand service to certain countries. This
CEO’s contribution to incitement would be less material than the CEO who
personally pushes to expand social media services. In the case of Myanmar,
publicly available information suggests that Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg falls
into the latter camp and may have satisfied the actus reus for complicity.
In August 2013, Zuckerberg personally announced an initiative called
“Internet.org,” “a plan to make the internet available for the first time to billions
of people in developing countries.”189 The CEO unveiled the proposal in a 10page white paper, posted on Facebook.190 Zuckerberg framed the plan as an
attempt to make “internet access available to those who cannot currently afford
it.”191 Consistent with this initiative, Facebook launched a Myanmar version of the
platform in 2015, although a version of the platform had been available years
prior. The service quickly attracted millions of users.192 According to the IIFFMM,
the “relative unfamiliarity of the population with the Internet and with digital
platforms and the easier and cheaper access to Facebook led to a situation in
Myanmar where Facebook is the Internet.”193 The IIFFMM further noted that the
platform became “a regularly used tool for the Myanmar authorities to reach the
public.”194
Several years before 2018, the year Facebook began taking down official
accounts, the Tatmadaw launched a systematic campaign which involved
“hundreds of military personnel who created troll accounts and news and celebrity
187
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189
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pages on Facebook and then flooded them with incendiary comments and posts
timed for peak viewership.”195 Tatmadaw officials repeatedly reinforced and
legitimized dehumanizing themes and narratives with more opaque posts from
their official accounts.196 Ultimately, the campaign culminated in the mass killings
of the Rohingya.197 The foregoing reports, to the extent that they are accurate,
suggest that by launching Internet.org and extending Facebook’s services to
Myanmar, Zuckerberg provided the Tatmadaw with a massive platform to
systematically promote dehumanizing narratives about the Rohingya. Like the
CEO’s contribution in The Zyklon B Case, Zuckerberg extended a commercial
service that proved indispensable to the commission of an international crime
(assuming the Tatmadaw’s campaign amounted to incitement).198 Accordingly, it
is at least plausible that Zuckerberg satisfied the actus reus for complicity.
The next pertinent inquiry is whether the CEO made the contribution
knowingly. The CEO is only complicit if he or she knew the inciters were using
the platform to commit direct and public incitement to genocide.199 Reflective of
this challenge, much of the litigation in The Zyklon B Case centered around the
issue of mens rea.200 The prosecution succeeded by pointing to multiple reports
by individual employees, as well as the fact that the company’s gas shipments
increased so significantly that Tesch must have known the end to which they
would be used.201 But the size of social media companies alone would make it
difficult for the CEO to know the particulars of any given business dealing.202
Presumably, there are everyday business operations of which the CEO has no
knowledge. And flaws in the company’s compliance system, while arguably
evidence of negligence or recklessness, could insulate the CEO from satisfying
the higher mens rea of knowledge.
On the other hand, even if a CEO’s subordinates do not report the
incitement to genocide, the CEO could be alerted to the situation by external
195
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sources. For example, a public official or the leader of a human rights group could
have channels to directly notify the CEO. Such a notification would need to
demonstrate the existence of a systematic campaign to incite genocide on the
CEO’s platform. Isolated notices of hate speech or deeply offensive language
would be insufficient. Assuming the veracity of such a report, the CEO’s
subsequent actions would bear heavily on his or her culpability. Once he or she
has the requisite mens rea of knowledge, continuing to provide inciters with a
platform would merit a finding of complicity.
With respect to Myanmar, the operative question is whether Zuckerberg
knew of the Tatmadaw’s campaign against the Rohingya. Whereas the case for
actus reus seems plausible, the case for mens rea is less convincing, at least based
on publicly available information. After Zuckerberg announced Internet.org, the
initiative that eventually brought Facebook to Myanmar, he said the following in
an interview with WIRED: “Our service is free, and there aren’t developed ad
markets in a lot of these countries. So for a very long time this may not be
profitable for us. But I’m willing to make that investment because I think it’s really
good for the world.”203 Many of Zuckerberg’s public comments around the
Internet.org announcement and thereafter reflect a similar optimism about the
potential of bringing Facebook to Myanmar.204 Misguided as it may have been,
such remarks do not evince knowledge that the Tatmadaw would use the platform
to incite genocide. And according to The New York Times, the propaganda
campaign went “undetected.”205 Moreover, the company’s scant devotion of
translation resources to Myanmar suggests that Zuckerberg did not personally
know about the ongoing and systematic attempt to dehumanize the Rohingya.206
Assuming these reports are true, Facebook’s CEO does not appear to satisfy the
requisite mens rea. Thus, even if Zuckerberg satisfied the relevant actus reus, a
finding of complicity would be unmerited, although further investigation would
be necessary to draw a firm conclusion either way.

2. The manager
In contrast to the CEO, the manager does not direct all aspects of the social
media company. For the sake of this analysis, he or she is placed in a senior-level
position in the company, with a more defined portfolio of responsibilities. The
manager directs a narrower set of operations and, as such, is more likely than the
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CEO to have expertise on certain aspects of the company. Furthermore, the
manager may be vested with decision-making authority regarding controversial
issues (for example, whether to remove a government official’s social media
account). Whereas a content moderator may handle day-to-day review of material
posted online, a manager could be responsible for synthesizing information and
for detecting broader trends on the platform. This analysis also assumes that the
manager personally spearheads certain business operations, like the accessibility
of social media to particular countries.
With respect to assistance, the case may be clearest for the manager. Unlike
the CEO, the manager would personally lead any effort to expand services into
certain countries and, as such, may be vested with critical decision-making
authority (for example, determining whether the costs associated with expansion
outweigh the benefits). Drawing parallels to The Zyklon B Case, the manager could
be analogized to Karl Weinbacher, the senior executive and manager convicted of
complicity, because of the extensive personal involvement in operationalizing the
harmful business initiative.207 Accordingly, the manager’s assistance to potential
inciters may be less attenuated than the CEO’s, especially where the manager has
the discretion to make a platform available in the first place. In satisfying the actus
reus of assistance, however, it is important to note this analysis assumes a manager
with a substantial degree of autonomy and a relatively deferential CEO. To the
extent that the CEO supersedes the manager’s responsibilities, the case is weaker
against the manager and stronger against the CEO.
Beyond the actus reus of assistance, the manager is relatively well-positioned
to know when the company is providing a platform to inciters.208 Whereas a
CEO’s broader responsibilities may insulate him or her from awareness of
ongoing incitement, responsibility over the platform’s growth and sustainability in
certain countries may fall squarely within the manager’s portfolio. Public reports
of Facebook’s activities in Myanmar highlight this distinction. While it remains
unclear whether Zuckerberg knew of ongoing incitement, a special report by
Reuters revealed that senior Facebook officials were warned over a span of years
“that [Facebook] was being used in Myanmar to promote racism and hatred of
Muslims, in particular the Rohingya.”209 For example, a tech entrepreneur who
worked in Myanmar “said he told Facebook officials in 2015 that its platform was
being exploited to foment hatred in a talk he gave at its headquarters in Menlo
Park, California.”210 Such warnings were reportedly made years before Facebook
207
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began taking down Tatmadaw accounts in 2018. The operative question would be
whether, pending further investigation, these notices illuminated an effort by the
Tatmadaw to incite genocide. If so, a prosecutor could potentially argue that by
providing the Tatmadaw with a massive platform, with knowledge of the
campaign, managers at Facebook satisfied the bar for complicity in inciting
genocide. The mere possibility of this argument suggests that managers could face
substantial risk of criminal liability.
While managers akin to senior executives risk criminal liability where the
facts support a finding of complicity in incitement, the case is likely weaker for
managers at lower tiers of the company. The foregoing analysis has used the term
“manager” as a proxy for executives with authority similar to Weinbacher in The
Zyklon B Case. Therefore, a mid-level supervisor at Facebook would not
necessarily face substantial risk, as the actus reus and mens rea for incitement
might be harder to satisfy for such an employee.

3. The content moderator
Having examined the CEO and the manager’s potential exposure to
international criminal liability, this Comment examines whether a social media
company’s content moderator could be complicit in inciting genocide. The
moderator is a low-level employee responsible for reviewing user-generated
content and making daily decisions as to whether certain content violates the
company’s community standards. As social media companies have increasingly
globalized their services, it has become more common for moderator
responsibilities to include translation.211
With respect to assistance, the moderator helps maintain the health of the
online community.212 While the failure of a moderator to remove an incitement or
an inciter from the platform might indirectly assist perpetrators, the moderator
does not decide whether certain countries, or individuals therein, will be granted
initial access to the platform. This lack of material decision-making authority
makes the moderator most comparable to Joachim Drosihn in The Zyklon B Case,
the gassing technician who was acquitted.213 As the Court acknowledged in that
case, low rank in the corporate hierarchy provides some degree of immunity with
respect to complicity when the assistance rendered stems from business dealings
involving more senior executives.
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Assuming a prosecutor surmounts the high bar of proving a moderator
sufficiently assisted an inciter, it would be an additional obstacle to show the
moderator knew of a coordinated effort to incite genocide. Since the moderator
is generally part of a broader team, each individually tasked with content review,
the responsibility of detecting and addressing more threatening patterns, like a
systematic campaign to incite genocide, likely requires more expertise and so
would fall to a more senior employee. Finally, even if a prosecutor could prevail
in showing assistance and knowledge, the deterrence effect of such a prosecution
would be minimal. Accordingly, the moderator faces the least risk of complicity.

4. Normative considerations
In sum, the foregoing cases demonstrate how social media employees at
varying levels of the corporate hierarchy could be complicit in inciting genocide.
While low-level employees face little risk of criminal liability, manager-level
employees and CEOs open themselves up to substantial risk when they knowingly
provide a platform to the perpetrators of incitement. Since CEOs may be more
insulated and less involved in the expansion of services than managers, they could
face less risk depending on the particular facts. Whether or not these results are
satisfying, they ought to provoke a broader discussion about whether the ICC
should more seriously consider the prosecution of social media executives and
how social media companies can reduce their employees’ exposure to criminal
liability. These questions are challenging, but they cannot be ignored, not after
what happened in Myanmar. Cognizant of this complexity, this Comment offers
three recommendations to help anchor future discussion.
First, the Rome Statute’s limitation on “natural persons,” listed in Article
25(1), should be amended to “legal persons,” thereby extending criminal liability
to corporations. Such an amendment would enable the ICC prosecutor to focus
on social media companies as distinct entities, as opposed to individuals whose
prosecution may do little to change corporate behavior.
Second, the U.N.—together with the ICC—should work to produce a set of
regulatory guidelines for social media companies that make their platforms
available to new countries. Such guidelines would clarify the potential risk of
international criminal liability posed by such ventures. These guidelines must be
narrowly tailored to the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
so as not to incentivize the over-policing by social media companies of speech
acts which fall short of incitement.
Third, social media companies should invest more heavily in efforts to
identify disinformation campaigns and bolster their content removal capabilities,
so as to mitigate the potentially deadly effects of propagation. In order to
determine whether content constitutes direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, social media companies should ensure they have content moderators
who not only understand the language of a country in which their platform is
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available but also sufficiently understand cultural context to know when implicit
statements may be indicative of calls for genocide. Social media companies should
also continue building partnerships with civil society organizations that can serve
as an additional source of early alerts that an incitement campaign is underway.
Such partnerships must not be considered replacements, however, for internal
mechanisms to identify and root out incitement.

VI. C ONCLUSION
This Comment examined whether social media companies and their
employees risk international criminal liability when they provide a platform to the
perpetrators of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. In doing so, this
Comment took a substantive approach rather than a procedural one, which might
examine issues such as jurisdiction. It explored the ICL around genocide and the
incitement to genocide (Section II), complicity (Section III), and corporate liability
(Section IV) to conclude that although a social media company cannot be
implicated in a crime as a distinct entity, individual employees at these companies
can be complicit in inciting genocide. This Comment took the position, citing
precedent, that complicity in incitement is not only a valid legal theory under ICL
but also a potentially powerful tool for the ICC prosecutor to combat genocide’s
early stages. This Comment also considered how complicity in incitement applies
at three levels in the hierarchy of a social media company, including the CEO, the
manager, and the content moderator (Section V). This analysis ought to provoke
broader discussion about how ICL might be reformed to deter future incitements
to genocide. Accordingly, this Comment concluded with a brief list of
recommendations to serve as a starting point for future dialogue.
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